INSTALLATION MANAGEMENT COMMAND -FLATTENING OR FLAT-LINING?
The Installation Management Command (IMCOM) is the United States Army's single largest organization, 1 employing over 73,200 personnel -civilians, contractors and military. 2 IMCOM, through its regions and garrisons, provides base operations (BASOPS) support to Army soldiers and their families, interservice and intragovernmental organizations, as well as non-governmental businesses on Army installations. BASOPS support includes facilities maintenance, utilities, police and gate guards, fire and emergency services, range planning and training, transportation, dining halls, laundry facilities, daycare centers, gyms, and the list goes on. IMCOM has diligently worked toward standardization of these services and to ensure the level of support is commensurate with a soldier's selfless duty to our country. However, in recent times there have been mistakes made with regards to IMCOM's progress. These mistakes could cripple or potentially break a command that was engineered solely to strengthen the quality of life for our soldiers and their families, as well as other tenants.
Therefore, this paper will research the history of IMCOM and its centralized installation management role within the Army, look at its downfall with regards to the reduction of a hierarchical layer and changes in management roles and responsibilities, and provide recommendations to re-energize IMCOM's successes and counter its problems.
IMCOM Background
IMCOM was originally created as the Installation Management Agency (IMA) on October 1, 2002. Its mission was to provide an "equitable, efficient and effective management of Army installations worldwide to support mission readiness, enable the well-being of soldiers, civilians and family members, and improve infrastructure and preserve the environment." 3 The informal reason for its creation is that Army installation facilities were in complete disrepair and services were not uniformly consistent. Some may remember notable videos on YouTube showing barracks and bathrooms in deplorable conditions. It was time to address quality assurance and customer supportimproving and standardizing operations and delivery of services. Hence, the BASOPS mission was pulled from the installation senior commanders from 15 various Army organizations and consolidated under one agency -IMA. 4 This transformation also allowed the organizations to focus on their own missions of materiel support, troop readiness, training, research and development, and so forth.
The organizational structure of IMA involved three levels: (1) The garrisons were commanded by Colonels/Lieutenant Colonels (O-6s/O-5s) or civilian General Managers (GS-15s/GS-14s) who reported directly to the RDs, and were senior rated by the installation senior commanders. Below is an organizational chart depicting the chain-of-command authority (figure 2). During the next few years, IMA went through its forming, storming and norming stages. Through diligence and intense working group sessions, IMA teams developed products and procedures that redefined BASOPS and set the path toward standardization. The first product was that of the standard garrison organization (SGO) which demonstrated how the garrison staff elements should be labeled and configured in the hierarchical structure (figure 3). In accordance with SGO, installations were categorized small, medium, large or most optimized strategically responsive (MOSR) based upon a variety of factors such as population size, diversity of tenants, and missions supported. Garrison staff senior level grades were determined from these size designations. This allowed for leadership uniformity, and ensured no one command could siphon applicants away from others during periods of recruitment. Additionally, SGO allowed for overall functional unity of effort, ease of reporting requirements, and strong information and training dissemination.
The second product was Common Levels of Support (CLS). CLS consisted of all BASOPS services that were provided on an Army installation by the garrison staff. In addition to the development of products, processes were also improved upon such as the management and execution of the Army's Installation Status Report (ISR)
Program. This program (a database really) assists Army leadership to make appropriate and responsible decisions required to sustain or improve the management of state or base facilities, natural infrastructure, and services. For instance, ISR Infrastructure documents and displays the condition of Army facilities by comparing the quantity of facilities available to the base requirement for each facility type, and the quality of base facilities to established Army standards. ISR Services evaluates service delivery performance (cost, quality and quantity) for base support services provided at each Army base. 8 A depiction of the entire program is at figure 5. budgeting, and execution of projects, acquisition of real estate, and demolition requirements related to MILCON, and other supporting activities. 10 More importantly, through strict regional operational control and assessment, MILCON projects were finally coded and prioritized based upon need, and not want.
Through the utility of standardized products and processes, the appropriate facilities were being improved or built at installations, and customers were beginning to realize a certain level of support would be provided at each and every base. Indeed, customers could expect CLS at every installation. Another positive, although anticipated, side effect was the efficiencies that this sameness created. If all garrisons use the same key code system for lodging or the same maintenance work order software system, then product pricing could be reduced through bulk purchases. from the West (see figure 7) . 15 This was only the beginning as BRAC implementation seemed to be the catalyst for future change to IMA structure and hierarchies. The second big change, concurrent with other Army Transformation initiatives, It is rather unusual for corporate practices to be applied against Department of Defense (DOD) entities, in particular those practices that pertain to the customer service field as DOD is not in the business to generate profits. In fact, in accordance with the Quadrennial Defense Review, the DOD mission is to "...protect the American people and advance our nation's interests." 18 The interpretation is that although customer service is an important function, it is not a priority. This is particularly true in the 31 This information reveals that the IMCOM management workforce appears to be at an already depleted state, and leadership should reconsider further reductions or suffer the consequences of significant operational failure. Unless the CG believed the outcome was one of efficiencies gained by transferring both workload and personnel to HQ in Texas. Yet, such a move may be regrettable as regional dispersion has great merit that will be lost upon consolidation.
Regional Design There is much to be said about geographical alignment, but there is also a benefit from geographical proximity. Proximity allows the RD and his staff to quickly perform site visits, inspections and assessments, coach/teach/mentor, as well as participate in important community events acting on behalf of the IMCOM CG. A plane trip from San Antonio, Texas to Fort Drum, New York would take twice as long and double in cost when compared to a plane trip from Fort Eustis, Virginia to New York.
Proximity also helps in relating to cultural influences and understanding social norms.
This is imperative when providing strategic communications to the public at large, whether it is on the closure of a base, the change in gate access, attendance at or sponsorship of events, or constructing a new child development center. Building effective relationships and partnerships helps strengthen Army installation resiliency.
Finally, proximity helps to keep time zone challenges to a minimum when planning meetings and conferences (be it over electronic media or onsite). Still, many would debate the need of a regional approach claiming that knowledge can be obtained and relationships built through other means, that the regional operational role can be performed from Texas. If the prospect of maintaining regions in CONUS can no longer be supported, then at a minimum, the hierarchical structure should remain intact. A large company with a shallow or flat hierarchical structure is an organization doomed for failure.
Hierarchies
Over the last 25 years, corporate rhetoric suggests the fewer hierarchical structures in a company, the better. Fewer layers mean less salary to pay, more efficient processes, and more timely products. Business theorists posit that reducing organizational layers in a company is best when the organization is small. However, when the organization is big, hierarchies remain the most workable and effective structures humans have yet invented for performing large, enduring, complicated tasks. 32 Take for example British Petroleum (BP). The BP Chief Executive Officer, Tony
Hayward, announced in October 2007 that while having the right strategy and resources, BP is not consistent and the organization has grown too complex. Therefore, BP planned to adopt more standardized procedures and shed up to four layers of management. 33 No one would argue that simplification is more efficient, but is it more Therefore leadership needs to act accordingly -whether revamp the venue to gain an increased customer base or just say "no" to an arbitrary leadership desire/want.
Lastly, the defense budget request calls for additional base realignment and closure (BRAC) rounds. 42 With the removal of two U.S. Army brigades from Europe as cost cutting measures, 43 it is only practical to support the reduction of bases. As for base realignment, DOD may want to first monitor the results of the 2005 BRAC Act, as those initiatives were only just completed in September 2011, before suggesting further moves.
IMCOM Future
The intent of IMCOM and its centralized installation management was to improve and standardize operations and delivery of services to Army installation personnel and organizations. However, decisions and actions over time have eroded the functionality of IMCOM. This can, and should be, fixed. Now is the time when IMCOM will need to be the junk yard dog of installation management -when consolidation of services under one sole source provider is key to efficiencies in this constrained environment...when we have to start saying "no" to customer demands as control and standardization of services is tantamount to good resource stewardship. SGO and CLS must be brought back in their original forms and in full force. Various BASOPS functions will need to be reviewed for redundancy and potential cuts, and prescribed levels of service will need to be re-established. Shadow workforces need to be uncovered and assimilated into IMCOM to create additional scales of efficiencies. Another round of BRAC should also be considered. To do this, functional capability will need to be restored at the regional level for strong lines of oversight, direction, communication, training, and mentorship.
Regional relevance is at a critical stage in the livelihood of IMCOM; if you maintain their reduced status or deactivate them altogether, an already streamlined flat IMCOM could very well mean a flat-lined IMCOM.
